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METAPHORS AND MODALITIES: MEDITATIONS ON
BOBBITT'S THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
Ian C. Bartrum*
Language is the Flesh-Garment, the Body, of Thought. I said that
imagination wove this Flesh-Garment; and does not she? Metaphors
are her stuff: examine Language; ... what is it all but Metaphors,
recognised as such, or no longer recognised; still fluid and florid, or
now solid-grown and colourless? If those same primitive elements
are the osseous fixtures in the Flesh-Garment, Language,-then are
Metaphors its muscles and tissues and living integuments.1
-Thomas Carlyle
In two remarkable books, written nearly a decade apart, Philip Bobbitt has brought
Ludwig Wittgenstein's cataclysmic insights on the nature of language to bear on the
study of American constitutionalism.2 The first of these books, entitled Constitutional
Fate, sets out to explore and describe the conversation that is the American Constitution,
and in so doing breaks sharply with traditional efforts to discover, in some external
source, a set of foundational constitutional meanings that might justify or discredit
particular legislation, decisions, or policies.3 From the outset, Bobbitt asks us to
recognize that the Constitution is not an artifact that exists in some space apart from
us; whose nature we might better search out by poking, teasing, or holding up to the
proper light.4 Rather the Constitution is the search: it is neither more nor less than
the practice-both in court and classroom--of constitutional law.5 "Law," he writes
in the second book, "is something we do, not something we have as a consequence
* Irving S. Ribicoff Fellow in Law, Yale Law School. I thank Philip Bobbitt, Bruce
Ackerman, Dennis Patterson, and the members of the Next Generation Legal Scholars
Symposium at Yale Law School for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I must reserve my
deepest gratitude, however, for Akhil Reed Amar who freely offered his invaluable support
and guidance throughout this endeavor.
I THOMAS CARLYLE, SARTOR RESARTUS: THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF HERR
TEUFELSDROCKH 73 (Charles Frederick Harrold ed., 1937).
2 Dennis Patterson has undertaken an insightful analysis of Bobbitt's work and its relation-
ship to Wittgenstein's. See Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 270 (1993); see also Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theory, 72
TEx. L. REv. 1837 (1994).
3 PHuiP BOBBrrT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982)
[hereinafter BOBBrrr, FATE].
4 Id. at 234-35.
5 id.
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of something we do."6 Just as the late Wittgenstein abandoned the search for fixed,
external referents and suggested that the meaning of some words is discoverable only
through the use of those words,7 Bobbitt discards the Sisyphean search for absolute
constitutional meanings and commits himself instead to describing the internal grammar
of constitutional discourse.
Bobbitt breaks constitutional grammar down into six "modalities" of argument,
each of which can produce legitimate assertions of constitutional meaning:
[1] the historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution); [2] textual (looking to the meaning
of the words of the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted
by the average contemporary "man on the street"); [3] structural
(inferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution man-
dates among the structures it sets up); [4] doctrinal (applying rules
generated by precedent); [5] ethical (deriving rules from those
moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the
Constitution); and [6] prudential (seeking to balance the costs and
benefits of a particular rule).'
Constitutional Fate undertakes, in biographical form, an exploration of each of
these modalities of argument.9 Bobbitt gives us historical argument through the story
of Walter Crosskey' s controversial multi-volume epic Politics and the Constitution
and explores textual arguments in the judicial work of Hugo Black; doctrinal argu-
ment emerges from a discussion of Henry Hart and the American Law Institute.' °
Bobbitt credits Charles Black's Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law
with revitalizing and giving name to structural argument, and he sees prudential argu-
ment at work in Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch." The final modality,
ethical argument, is Bobbitt' s own contribution to the lexicon, and he devotes much
of the remainder of the book to exploring the derivation and application of arguments
that rely on the ethos of American democracy.' 2
6 PHILIP BOBB1Tr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBrIr,
INTERPRETATION] (emphasis added).
' See LUDWIG WrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 3-7, 20-26 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell & Mott 2d ed. 1967) (1958) (presenting a theory of
meaning based on practice and usage as well as traditional reference). I have recently heard
Tony Kronman describe Wittgenstein as "the liquidator of the a priori," which I think neatly
describes Bobbitt's constitutional aims. Yale Faculty Workshop (Dec. 3, 2007) (on file with
author).
8 BOBBIrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 12-13 (emphasis added).
9 BOBBrIr, FATE, supra note 3, at 9-92.
10 Id. at 9, 14-15, 25-27, 42.
" Id. at 61, 68, 76-77, 92.
12 Id. at 93-177.
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But Bobbitt's inspired effort to escape the regressions that persist in founda-
tional accounts of constitutional meaning leaves some important kinds of questions
unanswered. First, his depiction of constitutional practice has a static quality to it;
he does little to explain how the modalities of argument may evolve or expand over
time. Second, Bobbitt struggles to provide a principled account of constitutional
decision making in the rare and difficult case where the different modalities may point
toward divergent, yet equally legitimate, outcomes. 3 Both of these issues arise as a
result of Bobbitt' s original insight, which is committed to an account of constitutional
meaning and legitimacy defined solely by the internal grammar of constitutional prac-
tice. If it is the accepted grammar that bestows legitimacy, that grammar must also
be capable of excluding certain kinds of arguments as illegitimate-it is this exclu-
sionary impulse that gives rise to Bobbitt's these-and-only-these-modalities stasis.
Likewise, when faced with divergent modalities, it is tempting to look outside the
practice for a means of resolution-perhaps by ranking the modes of argument-but
to indulge such a temptation is ultimately to resort to foundationalism and abandon
the Wittgensteinian project entirely. 4
I do not imagine that I can provide complete answers to these lingering and vexing
questions, particularly those surrounding the origins of the basic modalities, 5 but
"3 Bobbitt devotes much of his second book to this problem, which he resolves with an
ultimate appeal to judicial "conscience." It takes some fancy footwork, however, to demonstrate
that this "conscience" is not actually the ultimate external referent or foundation-which
would defeat the entire project. BOBBITr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 163. Rather,
Bobbitt sees conscience as part of the act of decision making, which is itself part of-and not
external to-the practice of constitutional law. In this sense, a decision does not define ultimate
constitutional meaning, rather it becomes one feature in the ongoing dialogue and practice.
Id. at 163-165. While I agree with this approach to the problem in principle, I do not think
it provides enough account of the grammatical methods by which such decisions modify and
enlarge the constitutional discourse. Bobbitt also provides an excellent, practice-based account
of intramodal conflicts, but I do not take up that issue here.
" For a thoughtful attempt at such a ranking scheme, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1189,
1252-68 (1987).
'" My intuition on this question is that the text-thus textualism-came first, and that the
other modalities grew up very quickly as part of the interpretive practice. To analogize to
lanuage practice, this is something like the phenomenon of designation and derivation that
is rigorously explored within the so-called "causal theory of reference." See, e.g., Richard
Boyd, Metaphor and Theory Change: What is "Metaphor" a Metaphor For?, in METAPHOR
AND THOUGHT 481, 496-500, 503 n.3 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993); SAUL A. KRIPKE,
NAMING AND NECEssrrY 91-97 (Basil Blackwell 2d ed., 1980) (1972); 2 HLARY PUTNAM,
The Meaning of "Meaning," in MIND, LANGUAGE, AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
215 (1975); 2 HILARY PUTNAM, The Refutation of Conventionalism, in MIND, LANGUAGE,
AND REALIrY: PHLOSOPHICAL PAPERS 153, 176-77 (1975). The causal theory of reference is,
however, a foundational explanation, in that it derives ultimate definition and meaning from
an original baptismal moment, and so I am not yet certain how best to account for this within
2008]
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I do hope in this paper to provide an internal, practice-based account of the evolution
of constitutional discourse. If successful, this account will incorporate the resolution
of difficult cases as among the possible moments of grammatical (and thus constitu-
tional) creativity. In appealing to Wittgenstein, Bobbitt reveals the basic similarities
between constitutional practices and linguistic practices, and thus, as we begin to
consider how our constitutional discourse might grow and evolve, it seems appro-
priate to examine the means by which our language does the same. While it is likely
that language evolves in a number of different ways, I suggest that one of the most
important and substantial forms of linguistic growth and creativity is what we call
metaphor.16 It is in part through metaphor that we capture and express new meanings,
expand our linguistic capabilities, and perhaps even enhance our cognitive capacities.
In Carlyle's terms, a strong metaphor may gain acceptance, ossify, and become part
of our literal discourse; then new metaphors, with still vital figurative content, become
the moving parts-the soft growth tissue--of our expressive grammar and practice.17
And so it is with our constitutional practice: strong argumentative modalities have
ossified into the accepted grammar of constitutional law, but there are always new
arguments, built on figurative uses of the accepted modalities, that make up the fluid
and florid frontiers of constitutional discourse.
This paper employs a particular theory of metaphors-Max Black's version of
the interaction theory-in the hope of providing a useful account of the evolution
of constitutional law." I contend that it is in the interaction, or figurative blending,
of Bobbitt's modalities that we create new constitutional meanings and surmount
constitutional impasses, and that we can only judge the merits of such endeavors over
time, as we see which of our metaphors ossify and which fall away. Seen this way,
Bobbitt's paradigm. What I can say is that I do not dispute that some aspects of language-
and perhaps some moments of constitutional law-are best reflected in these foundational
terms. But there are other aspects of law-interpretation and advocacy are paradigms-for
which foundational accounts may fail and a practice-based account (like Bobbitt's) may
succeed. It is these interpretive aspects that are the limited subject of this paper, and I contend
that the interaction theory of metaphor is a practice-based account of linguistic evolution, and,
as such, it may complement and expand Bobbitt's theory of constitutional law.
16 There are, of course, other tropes that may operate to similar effect-metonymy and
synecdoche come to mind-and theoretical accounts of these forms may also have useful
application to the study of constitutional discourse. For an explanation of these tropes, see
Paul Henle, Metaphor, in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND CULTURE 173, 175-76 (Paul Henle ed.,
1958). The limited goal of this paper, however, is to begin a discussion of the most common
of these figurative modes and to explore its relationship to law-as-practice.
17 CARLYLE, supra note 1.
"8 This is in no way meant to suggest that Black's theory is the most recent or sophis-
ticated theory of metaphor. It is only a theory I find particularly persuasive and apt for the
purposes of my argument here. For an excellent, more recent approach see George Lakoff,
The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in METAPHOR ANDTHOUGHT, supra note 15, at 202,
202-5 l(explaining how metaphor has become a part of everyday language).
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constitutional law, like language, is a creative practice, and its great practitioners are
more poets than logicians. My application of Black's theory to constitutional law is,
in this sense, itself metaphoric, as was Bobbitt's original application of Wittgenstein:
I do not suggest that there is a literal relationship between linguistic practice and law
practice-but rather a metaphoric one.' 9 My hope is that by superimposing an idea
from the philosophy of language onto the study of constitutional law, I can say some-
thing figurative about the growth of law that is difficult-if not impossible-to say
literally. It is probably too much to hope that my metaphor may eventually ossify and
become part of the lexicon, as has Bobbitt's.2 °
With that said, this paper begins with a brief examination of Black's interaction
theory, and his controversial claim that metaphors can actually create new meanings
or semantic content. I then provide examples of interactive metaphors at work in three
paradigmatic spheres of constitutional discourse: theory, advocacy, and judging.2
I look first to theory, with an examination of Akhil Reed Amar' s persuasive discussion
of the approach he calls "intratextualism."22 I then explore metaphorical advocacy
as practiced by Louis Brandeis in his famous brief in Muller v. Oregon.23 I turn finally
to judging and discuss perhaps the most canonical of twentieth-century constitutional
decisions: Brown v. Board of Education.24 In each of these spheres of constitutional
discourse, I see something akin to Black's theory of metaphor underlying moments
of grammatical creativity, and I conclude that it is only in assessing the acceptance
or rejection of these metaphors over time that we can truly evaluate their constitu-
tional merit.
I. MAx BLACK'S INTERACTION THEORY OF METAPHOR
Philosophers have treated the phenomenon of metaphor as something of an
interesting, if inconsequential, puzzle for thousands of years. The classical theory,
generally attributed to Aristotle, holds that metaphors are simply elliptical or
"9 What is of fundamental importance is that they are both practices, by which I mean a
social organizing system within which certain acts or utterances are recognized and meaningful,
and others are not.
20 Dennis Patterson has noted that, when asked for his opinion on the best recent book on
constitutional theory, Laurence Tribe responded, "'There are two, and they're both by the
same author,' recommending Bobbitt's Constitutional Fate and Constitutional Interpretation."
Dennis Patterson, The New Leviathan, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1715, 1731 n.64 (2003) (book
review) (quoting E-mail from Stuart Taylor to Dennis Patterson (Feb. 18, 2003)).
21 I do not mean to suggest that these are the only spheres of constitutional practice. There
are certainly others, including the legislative and executive domains.
22 Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1999) [hereinafter Amar,
Intratextualism].
13 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908).
24 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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abbreviated similes." Thus, we can easily translate Plautus's metaphorical phrase
"man is a wolf to man" into the corresponding simile: "man is like a wolf to man. 26
Seen in this way, metaphors are relatively uninteresting, as they are ultimately reduc-
ible to literal assertions, often with relatively uncomplicated referents and meanings.
Aristotle's view, commonly known as the comparison view of metaphors,27 enjoyed
widespread acceptance for many years-and has even had something of a rebirth in
the recent work of Robert Fogelin.2s But in the twentieth century, theorists increas-
ingly challenged this classical account as simplistic and incomplete. Some argued
that, unlike a simile, a successful metaphor conveys something more than can be
literally paraphrased: a contention that, if true, would elevate metaphor to a place
among the most important of linguistic forms. 9
Perhaps the most interesting of these new theories emerged from the work of
English philosopher and literary critic Ivor Armstrong Richards, who is perhaps best
known for his collaborations with Charles Ogden.3" Richards strains at the bit of a
classical tradition that has reduced metaphor to "a sort of happy extra trick with
words .... a grace or ornament or added power of language, not its constitutive
25 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, Bk. III, ch. 4, 1406b, reprinted in ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 12 (W.
Rhys Roberts trans., 1954). Max Black terms this account a substitution view of metaphor;
the metaphor is simply a substitute for a literal phrase. MAX BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS:
STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY 31 (1962) [hereinafter BLACK, MODELS AND
METAPHORS]. I suggest that the substitution view is just a subcategory of the better-known
comparison view described below-which Black seems to distinguish.
26 See PLAUTUS, ASINARiA: THE ONE ABOUT THE ASSES 53 (John Henderson trans.,
2006). Henderson actually translates homo homini lupus to say "A man's a wolf, not a man."
Id. at 52-53. The more popular wording, however, seems to be that reflected in the text of
this Article. See, e.g., THEADAGES OFERASMUS 41 (William Barker ed., 2001); DICTIONARY
OF QUOTATIONS 347, 427 (Bergen Evans ed., 1968).
27 Perhaps the genesis of the comparison part of the theory is more evident in Poetics,
where Aristotle writes: "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to some-
thing else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from
species to species, or on grounds of analogy." ARISTOTLE, POETICS ch. 20, sec. 21, 1457b,
reprinted in ARISTOTLE, POETICS 251 (Ingram Bywater trans., 1954). But see supra note 25.
28 See generally ROBERT J. FOGELIN, FiGURATIvELY SPEAKING (1988) (reinvigorating
comparison theory).
29 See, e.g., Henle, supra note 16, at 173-75 (hypothesizing that the focal term in a meta-
phor has a literal and a metaphorical meaning); see also NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF
ART 68-71 (1968) (puzzling that many phrases are literally false while metaphorically true);
John R. Searle, Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 83-111 (Andrew
Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) (theorizing the reader's role in adding semantic content to a metaphor).
But see Donald Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, in ON METAPHOR (Sheldon Sacks ed.,
1978), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 415-26 (A.P. Martinich ed., 3d ed. 1996)
(rejecting figurative theories and arguing that "metaphors mean what the words, in their most
literal interpretation mean, and nothing more").
3 See, e.g., C.K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING: A STUDY OFTHE
INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE UPON THOUGHT AND OF THE SCIENCE OF SYMBOLISM (1945).
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form."'" Rather, he sees something more profound and creative at work, and he
comes thus to an early interaction theory of metaphor, upon which Max Black would
build his own theoretical edifice several decades later.32 To begin, Richards posits
that the mechanics of metaphor are derivative of the basic mechanics of thought:
"[Flundamentally [metaphor] is a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts,
a transaction between contexts. Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison,
and the metaphors of language derive therefrom., 33 He then goes on to suggest that
a metaphor results from the interaction of two distinct ideas (or contexts), which Max
Black would later label the frame and focus terms of a given metaphor.3 ' The frame
is the principal idea or context that a metaphor hopes to illuminate, while the focus is
the secondary idea or context that interacts with the principal to create the metaphor."
To take Plautus again as an example, "man's relation to man" is the frame, while
"wolf' is thefocus.36 This much is not inconsistent with classical comparison theory,
but Richards goes on to make a more provocative claim: "[In many of the most
important uses of metaphor, the co-presence of the [frame] and [focus] results in a
meaning (to be clearly distinguished from the [frame]) which is not attainable without
their interaction.,37 Richards makes some effort to explain the creative force he
attributes to metaphor as a product of the reader's (or hearer's) reconstruction of the
interacting "common characteristics" of the frame and focus,38 but he leaves a more
detailed resolution of this question as an invitation to posterity, which Max Black
happily accepted in his 1962 book Models and Metaphors.39
While Black is enamored of Richards's ideas about interaction, he is dissatis-
fied with several aspects of the overall account. Most significantly, he takes issue
with Richards's contention that a metaphor's reader must assimilate the "common
characteristics" of the presented ideas.' For Black, this seems a relapse into older
comparison theories, which rely on some set of inherent similarities between the
3' I.A. RICHARDS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC 90 (1936).
32 Id. at 89-95, 100. W. Bedell Stanford has presented a similar account, which he calls
an integration theory. W. BEDELL STANFORD, GREEK METAPHOR 100-05 (Johnson Reprint
Corp. 1972) (1936).
13 RICHARDS, supra note 31, at 94.
' Id. at 96. Richards actually has his own somewhat confusing labels for these terms-
the tenor and the vehicle-but I have chosen to use Black's labels throughout for the sake
of consistency. Id. In choosing the labelsframe and focus, Black employed his own metaphor
by invoking the concept of a painting or photograph. Black is comfortable using metaphors
(as long as they are good ones) to illuminate theory, which, again, is how I see my own appli-
cation of Black's theory to Bobbitt's. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
as BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS, supra note 25, at 27-28.
36 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
3' RICHARDS, supra note 31, at 100 (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 116-20.
39 BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS, supra note 25, at 35-47.
0 Id. at 39 (quoting RICHARDS, supra note 31, at 117) (emphasis added).
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frame and focus. Rather, Black thinks Richards is more insightful when he speaks
of the reader connecting the two ideas: "In this 'connection' resides the secret and
the mystery of metaphor. To speak of the 'interaction' of two thoughts 'active
together' . . . emphasiz[es] the dynamic aspects of a good reader's response to a
nontrivial metaphor."'" Rather than asking the reader to tease out the "common
characteristics" that frame and focus share, Black suggests that the focus superim-
poses its own "system of associated commonplaces" over the commonplaces asso-
ciated with the frame.42 It is then the reader's job to reconstruct these two sets of
associated commonplaces in a way that "suppresses some details [and] emphasizes
others."43 When such a metaphor is successfully created and reconstructed, it can
evoke a new kind of meaning.44
Black provides several illustrations of his theory, a few of which may be helpful
here. First, he asks us to imagine gazing at the night sky through a piece of opaque
glass with a number of transparent lines cut into it.45 We only see the stars that we can
successfully maneuver into the lines on the glass, and the stars we do see are orga-
nized by the lines' structure.' Black suggests that we can think of the glass as a meta-
phor, and of the transparent lines as the associated commonplaces relevant to both
the frame and foCUS. 47 In this sense, the metaphor gives us a new picture of the night
sky (complete with new constellations, I suppose). Or, he imagines trying to describe
a great battle using only terms drawn from the vocabulary of chess:
The enforced choice of the chess vocabulary will lead some
aspects of the battle to be emphasized, others to be neglected,
and all to be organized in a way that would cause much more
strain in other modes of description. The chess vocabulary filters
and transforms: it not only selects, it brings forward aspects of
the battle that might not be seen at all through another medium.4
8
4' Id. (quoting RICHARDS, supra note 31, at 125).
42 Id. at40--41.
41 Id. at41.
4 Black recognizes that any given reader will bring her own set of "associated common-
places" with her to the metaphor. Id. at 40. We may all associate different things with the word
"wolf," and thus there is the potential for metaphors to have entirely indeterminate meanings.
But Black suggests that the successful metaphor-reader does not look strictly to her own
associations, but rather to the associations that are "the common possession of the members
of some speech community." Id. Likewise, a successful metaphor-maker must use terms that
"readily and freely evoke[]" certain associations in that community. Id. This issue will become
important when I discuss successfid constitutional metaphors below.
41 Id. at 41.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 42.
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In this metaphor, the battle is the frame and the chess vocabulary is the focus; the
interaction of the two systems of associated commonplaces takes place in both the
describer's and the listener's minds. The result is an understanding of the battle and
its meaning that might not have been possible through literal description.49
But Black also wants to provide an account of what it is to think metaphorically, °
as he sees the process of recognizing and reconstructing a metaphor--of "think[ing]
of something (A) as something else (B)"-as critical to an understanding of how a
metaphor can create new kinds of meaning or semantic content.5 To illuminate this
issue he uses a geometrical example-the Star of David-which he suggests we can
think about in several ways: (1) two congruent equilateral triangles superimposed;
(2) a hexagon with congruent equilateral triangles on each edge; or (3) three congruent
parallelograms superimposed.52
%
I\
(1) (2) (3)
Each of these constructions of the Star is a metaphor of a very simplistic sort, in which
the metaphor-maker asks the metaphor-reader to view the Star as some other group
of shapes. The reader is then forced to reconstruct the image in a new way, which per-
haps offers a new insight or perspective on the original Star. But, for all its clarity,
Black concedes that this example is too simplistic to explain the creation of any kind
4' To use an illustration of my own, I suggest thinking of the way that playing more than
one musical note at a time can produce a chord. In this example, the overlapping notes create
a new sound that cannot be understood simply in terms of its constituent parts.
50 In more recent years, several theorists have developed more sophisticated accounts of
the relationship between metaphor and thought. Of particular interest is the work of Michael
Reddy, who has demonstrated that for at least one important class of expressions--the "conduit
metaphor"--the source of metaphor is in thought, not language. Michael J. Reddy, The Conduit
Metaphor: A Case of Frame Conflict in Our Language About Language, in METAPHOR AND
THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 164. Reddy's work suggests that metaphor is a major part of the
way we typically conceptualize and experience the world.
"' This next step in Black's analysis is clearest in a later paper on the topic. Max Black,
More About Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 19, 31.
52 Id. at 31-32. I have omitted two further suggestions for constructing the Star.
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of new meaning.53 After all, the reader only need draw on shapes that she already
knows to reconstruct the metaphor. There is no creativity-or, in Black's words
"conceptual innovation"-required, and thus these metaphors are easily reduced to
literal statements (in something like the way depicted above).54
It is only when the metaphor requires the reader to see something that the dia-
gram cannot quite depict that she must undertake an act of meaningful metaphoric
construction. As an example, Black asks us to think of a straight line as a "collapsed
triangle, with its vertex on the base."55 This richer (and, Black suggests, more common)
kind of metaphor requires the reader to do some imaginative work to create a concept
that might meet the metaphor-maker's demand.56 The metaphoric enterprise is thus
a two-party endeavor; it is a communicative act within a larger linguistic practice
that requires both parties to know the rules, limitations, and flexibilities of a shared
language. It remains a fair question whether this communicative act can really create
some new kind of meaning-some theorists are not convinced 57-but Black believes
this is the case. He suggests thinking about the problem by considering the following
question: "Did the slow-motion appearance of a galloping horse exist before the
invention of cinematography? '58 He argues that the "view" in question only arises
from a man-made instrument, but that "what is seen in a slow-motion film becomes
a part of the world once it is seen."59 Black contends that good metaphors function
like the camera, as "'cognitive instruments,' indispensable for perceiving connections
that, once perceived, are then truly present."' Thus, the metaphoric instrument can
bring into being a new kind of meaning.
There is a further question, of course, about why we accept and use metaphors
as part of our linguistic practice. One possible answer-not without its proponents-
is that we do it simply because we can; that the use of metaphor is part entertainment,
part vanity, and part curiosity. A more compelling answer, however, is that we do it
because we need to. There are thoughts, senses, and insights we simply cannot ex-
press in literal terms, but which we may be able to capture in an apt metaphor. Even
if we are condemned-as Wittgenstein says-to "running against the walls of our
3 Id. at 32.
5 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Haig Khatchadourian, Metaphor, 8 BRIT. J. OF AESTHETICS 227, 235-37
(1968) (questioning whether recognition of new similarity or meaning entails creation of new
meaning); see also Davidson, supra note 29, at 415.
58 Black, More About Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 37. The
slow-motion film of a galloping horse famously resolved the question as to whether all four
feet are actually off of the ground at the same time-they are.
59 Id.
o Id. (emphasis added).
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[language] cage," perhaps a strong, vital metaphor can bend the bars a little.6 ' It is
this function, the improvisational ability to fill in the gaps in our expressive capacities,
which I believe is metaphor's central contribution to our linguistic practice.62 And
it is in this capacity that Black's theory of metaphor is helpful to Bobbitt's theory of
constitutional modalities, where, as discussed below, "modal metaphors" can help fill
in the expressive gaps in our constitutional discourse.
The final question, which becomes critically important as we superimpose Black's
theory onto constitutional practice, is whether or how we can know when we have
constructed a "good" or "strong" metaphor. On its face, this question seems to beg
for a foundational kind of answer-one that provides clear constructive preferences
of some kind-but I do not think such an answer is possible. Because a metaphor is
a communicative act that requires both creation and reconstruction, the metaphor-
maker can never know in advance whether her effort will succeed in conveying a new
or valuable kind of meaning to the metaphor-reader. This does not mean that there
are no rules by which the metaphor-maker must abide. Certainly, she must speak the
shared language-she cannot utter nonsense words or wholly ignore the appropriate
grammar and syntax-if she hopes to even engage the metaphor-reader in the com-
municative enterprise. But she cannot know the ultimate value of her metaphor as a
new "cognitive instrument" until she sees how it is reconstructed and assimilated into
the existing linguistic practice. Thus, the greatest end for an expressive gap-filling
metaphor is to become what we call a "dead metaphor": one that has been so well
accepted over time that it has lost its metaphoric sense and taken on a very literal
meaning ("table leg," for example).63 Dead metaphors, to again borrow Carlyle's
image, help to make up the osseous fixtures-the skeleton--of our language body,
but we must keep constructing new and vital metaphors to keep that body alive and
growing.' Such, I contend, is also the nature of our constitutional discourse: we have
built a sturdy analytical skeleton capable of resolving most issues, but, at the living
edge, we still rely on strong metaphors to fill in the emerging gaps in our practice.
61 Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Lecture On Ethics, 74 THE PHIL. REv. 3, 12 (1965).
62 Black calls these gap-filling metaphors "a species of catachresis," which he defines as
"the use of a word in some new sense in order to remedy a gap in the vocabulary .... [I]f a
catachresis serves a genuine need, the new sense introduced will quickly become part of the
literal sense." BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS, supra note 25, at 33.
63 Black, More about Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 25.
6 Shelley put the idea in perhaps more accessible terms than did Carlyle:
[The poet's] language is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the before
unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their apprehension,
until the words which represent them, become, through time, signs for
portions or classes of thoughts instead of pictures of integral thoughts;
and then if no new poets should arise to create afresh the associations
which have been thus disorganized, language will be dead to all the
nobler purposes of human intercourse.
PERCY BYssHE SHELLEY, A DEFENCE OF POETRY 7 (L. Winstanley ed., 1911).
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HI. MODAL METAPHORS
The idea that Black's theory of metaphor might contribute something useful
to Bobbitt's theory of the Constitution is, as I have said, itself a metaphoric kind of
thought. After all, Bobbitt's theory describes constitutional practice in terms of modal-
ities, not words, and it seems difficult to credibly assert that interacting modalities
are literally equivalent to interacting words. Nonetheless, I think there is something
figurative and important to be gained in thinking about the evolution of constitutional
discourse in terms of modal metaphors; I suggest that conceptualizing overlapping
modalities as interacting systems of associated commonplaces might serve as the kind
of cognitive instrument that can reveal new constitutional meanings. To create a
modal metaphor consists in taking one of Bobbitt's modalities as a Blackianframe,
and then positing another modality as the metaphoricfocus. 65 The metaphor-reader
(the theorist; the judge; the lawyer) then reconstructs the interacting commonplaces
conceptually, and whatever meaning the metaphor produces then becomes a part of
constitutional discourse. We can only assess the ultimate value of the modal metaphor
as part of constitutional practice over time, as we gauge its usefulness and assimilation
into the literal grammar.
This section presents several examples of modal metaphors at work in our consti-
tutional discourse, attempts to analyze their construction and method, and evaluates
their contribution to constitutional law. In an effort to cover three paradigmatic
spheres of constitutional practice, I have chosen an example from theory, one from
advocacy, and one from judging. I analyze each example within the basic terms of
Black's interaction theory: I posit one modality as theframe and another as the focus,
and then reconstruct the resulting modal metaphor.66 I then assess the contribution
that each metaphor has made to the Constitution in terms of its acceptance into the prac-
tice, and the expressive gaps it may have filled in our discourse. The first example,
"intratextualism," is somewhat problematic as an example of constitutional evolution
in that the method seems to have been part of the practice from very early in our consti-
tutional history. It is, however, an excellent example of a modal metaphor, whenever
it originally came into being, and so I have chosen to present it first as a clear illus-
tration of the mechanics of the metaphoric process. The following two examples-
the Brandeis Brief and Brown v. Board of Education-represent more clearly defined
moments of constitutional creativity or evolution in our history.
65 It is critical here to note that the modal metaphor must be constructed in terms of the pre-
existing modalities of constitutional discourse. To do otherwise is analogous to constructing
a linguistic metaphor with nonsense words--there is little, if any, chance of success in such
an endeavor. But see LEWIS CARROLL, Jabberwocky, in THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
22-24 (MacMillan 1924) (1872) (though this is perhaps more an example of portmanteau
than nonsense).
66 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
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A. Akhil Reed Amar: Intratextualism
In an influential article published in the Harvard Law Review, Akhil Amar iden-
tifies an interpretive methodology he calls "intratextualism," and presents several
compelling examples of the method at work in canonical cases and commentaries.67
He describes the approach as an effort to "read a contested word or phrase that ap-
pears in the Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the
same (or a very similar) word or phrase. 68 In a simplistic sense, the intratextualist
"us[es] the Constitution as its own dictionary"; 69 but, in a deeper sense, the method
departs from typical clause-bound textualism and demands a holistic interpretation of
the document in its entirety. In this way, intratextualism is a paradigmatic example
of the modal metaphor, as Amar self-consciously suggests a measured, incremental
blending of Bobbitt's grammatical structures.7 ° Indeed, from the opening paragraph,
Amar bows to Bobbitt' s work, and indicates his intent to offer his own contribution
to the lexicon:
Interpreters squeeze meaning from the Constitution through a
variety of techniques-by parsing the text of a given clause, by
mining the Constitution's history, by deducing entailments of the
institutional structure it outlines, by weighing the practicalities of
proposed readings of it, by appealing to judicial cases decided
under it, and by invoking the American ideals it embraces....
[Intratextualism is] yet another rich technique of constitutional
interpretation.7'
While Bobbitt might suggest that this technique is simply a subspecies of his textu-
alist modality, Amar makes a compelling case for intratextualism' s independence.72
It is certainly distinct from the specific brand of textualism Bobbitt describes, which
defines words "as they would be interpreted by the average contemporary 'man on
67 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 22, at 748-82. As I noted above, Professor Amar does
not claim to have invented this approach-only to have identified it-but he persuasively dem-
onstrates that it is an independent modality of interpretation, outside of Bobbitt's original six.
Id. at 788-91. It is this independence, this methodological distinctiveness, which is of interest
to me here, as I hope to show that intratextualism is a paradigmatic example of a modal meta-
phor, in that it combines two of the original modalities. And, whatever its origins, Professor
Amar's recognition and explication of the technique has introduced a new interpretive tool into
the constitutional workplace. It is this growth or evolution in the practice-if it has occurred-
that I want to explain through the processes of Black's interaction theory.
6' Id. at 748.
69 Id. at 756.
70 Id. at 754.
72 Id. at 748.i2 d. at 788-91.
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the street."'73 The importance of this distinction becomes clear in the examples Amar
provides, and it is useful to recount a few of his illustrations here.
To avoid "stacking the deck," Amar draws his examples directly from the central
texts of the constitutional canon, and the first opinion he explores is John Marshall's
in McCulloch v. Maryland.74 Marshall's argument supporting Congress's power to
establish a national bank is rich in the various modalities and textures of constitutional
argument, and Amar begins by identifying passages grounded in text, history, struc-
ture, prudence, ethos, and even doctrine (though McCulloch cites no case by name).75
Amar moves on, however, to reveal a novel form of argument-intratextualism-at
work in Marshall's analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause.76 Careful readers
recall that Marshall did not rely on this clause as a source of enlarged federal powers,
but addressed it only to counter Maryland's contention that the words act to limit
Congressional authority.77 The state argued for a restrictive, mathematical reading
of the word "necessary," which would foreclose federal authority over any matter not
ineluctably related to an expressly enumerated power.78 As Marshall put it, Maryland
asked the Court to read the clause "as limiting the right to pass laws for the execution
of the granted powers, to such as are indispensable, and without which the power would
be nugatory. 7 9 It is in support of his own broader reading of the word "necessary"-
one that "imports no more than that one thing is convenient ... to another"' -that
Marshall took "the intriguing methodological turn" to which Amar draws our attention.8'
Amar observes that, instead of looking to a common dictionary or some other ety-
mological source for guidance, Marshall turned "to another passage in the Constitution
itself, in effect using the Constitution as its own dictionary."8 Indeed, Marshall found
the word "necessary" employed very nearby in Article 1, Section 10, which prohibits
a state from imposing "duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection laws."83 In Marshall's view, the prefix "abso-
lutely" would be superfluous if the drafters had not understood the word "necessary"
to have a broader meaning than the strict mathematical one that Maryland urged.'
71 BOBBrIT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 12.
" Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 22, at 749-50 (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
75 Id. at 750-55. It is interesting, in this sense, that Marshall perhaps helped establish, or
at least ratified, the basic modalities of constitutional argument in this canonical opinion.
76 Id. at 755-56.
77 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 412 (1819).
78 Id. at 413.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 22, at 756.
82 Id.
83 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2) (emphasis
altered).
'4 Id. at 414-15.
[Vol. 17:157
METAPHORS AND MODALITIES
Marshall then drove the intratextual point home by equating the word "necessary"
to "needful," and observing that:
The [Article IV, Section 3] power to "make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to
the United States," is not more comprehensive, than the power
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carry-
ing into execution" the powers of the government. Yet all admit
the constitutionality of a territorial government, which [like a
national bank] is a corporate body.85
Amar points out that Marshall might also have looked to other constitutional uses of
the word "necessary" as evidence: "In Article V, for example, Congress is empowered,
'whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,' to propose constitu-
tional amendments. Context here seems to make abundantly clear that the test is prac-
tical not logical."86 But the point is made: Amar demonstrates that Marshall employed
an independent interpretive technique-neither strictly textual, nor quite structural-
in support of his claim about the constitutional meaning of the word "necessary."
One more of Amar' s examples-this one taken from constitutional scholarship-
helps to fully illustrate the power of this modal metaphor. In keeping with his canon-
ical approach, Amar examines John Hart Ely's twentieth-century classic, Democracy
and Distrust.97 After summarizing Ely's generally holistic approach to textual inter-
pretation, Amar suggests that Ely's specific approach "makes at least six intratextual
moves.""8 Without getting into each of these moves, it is enlightening to focus on his
discussion of Ely's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause.89 This clause is of particular interest and importance here because, while
leading scholars agree that it provides the best textual basis for incorporating the
Bill of Rights against the states,90 Supreme Court doctrine has all but read the words
85 Id. at 422 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 and art. IV, § 3) (emphasis added).
86 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 22, at 757 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. V) (emphasis
added).
87 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw (1980).
88 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 22, at 780.
89 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.").
90 See, e.g., AKHiL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
166-214 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS] (detailing the textual and historical con-
nections between the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Bill of Rights); Michael W.
McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 665,
692 (1997) ("From the perspective of text and history, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment would appear to be a more plausible basis for the protection
of substantive rights (whether incorporated from the Bill of Rights or based on other sources)
than the Due Process Clause.").
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out of existence.9' Faced with such a direct modal conflict, Amar suggests that Ely
turned to a hybrid (I would say "metaphoric") interpretive mode: intratextualism. 9
Amar observes that Ely placed the words "privileges" and "immunities" alongside
the passage from Article IV containing the same words, a move that enabled him "to
contrast the substantive rights language of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause with the equal rights language of its Equal Protection Clause."93
This comparison makes it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment means to apply a set
of substantive rights to all citizens equally. With this interpretive framework in place,
Amar suggests that Ely could have gone further to establish the content of these sub-
stantive rights by exploring the historical understanding of Article IV's first section.94
Amar briefly suggests that such an exploration reveals that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges or Immunities Clause promises all citizens equal enjoyment of the civil
rights (speech and religion interalia)-but not the political rights (voting and jury ser-
vice inter alia)-that the Constitution provides. 95 Thus, Ely and Amar's intratextual
approach provides a persuasive interpretive modality through which to understand
the Fourteenth Amendment. Their instructive commentary cannot, of course, dissolve
the doctrinal block that the Slaughter-House Cases impose-that is the privileged
prerogative of the Supreme Court in our constitutional practice-but it does allow
us to perceive the Constitution and its meaning in a new and illuminating way. And
that, after all, is the purpose of a modal metaphor.
Having demonstrated, I hope, what it is that Amar means by "intratextualism,"
we can now analyze the metaphoric structure of this method using the terms of Max
Black's interaction theory. Recall that Black sees a metaphor as the deliberate inter-
action of two ideas or contexts, which causes an overlap of "associated common-
places" that the reader must reconstruct.96 Black labels these two interacting ideas
the frame and the focus; the former being the primary context, upon which the latter
hopes to shed new light.97 Black's choice of terms is meant to evoke the image of
a painting, in which the frame holds the entire field of expression, while the focus
directs the viewer's attention to a spot of the artist's choosing. Intratextualism---as
a modal metaphor-takes the textualist modality as its frame, and then posits the
structural modality as its focus. To better understand this insightful move, it is
helpful to review Bobbitt's description of the two original modalities.
"' Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-78 (1873).
92 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 22, at 780.
93 id.
94 id.
9' Id. at 780-81. Professor Amar undertakes a very thorough and enlightening exploration
of this issue in his book on the Bill of Rights. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 90, at
166-214.
96 See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
97 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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Textualism, Bobbitt tells us, is "argument that is drawn from a consideration of
the present sense of the words of [a constitutional] provision."98 In response to a sug-
gestion that the Warren Court had unduly restricted police interrogations, Hugo Black-
Bobbitt's textual protagonist-expressed the ideal this way: "The Constitution says
absolutely and in words that nobody can deny ... that 'no person shall be compelled
in a criminal case, to be a witness against himself.' And so, when [you] say the Court
did it, that's just a little wrong. The Constitution did it."99 Here Black exemplifies
Bobbitt's characterization of the textualist judge as "a non-decider... a mere conduit
for the prohibitions of the Constitution"; an agent enforcing the higher law "on a basis
readily apprehendable by the people at large, namely, giving the common-language
meanings to constitutional provisions."1" Defined in this way, textualism does not
quite have room for the intratextualist, who would give more documentarian meanings
to constitutional words and phrases. And yet intratextualism does not seem wholly
outside of the accepted constitutional grammar, and so from where does this new
modality arise? It is undoubtedly grounded firmly in the textualist's insistence on the
primacy of the words-as Hugo Black put it, "You see, you have laws written out.
That's the object in law, to have it written out"1 0-but it bends in its focus towards
a different, more holistic approach to constitutional interpretation: structuralism.
Bobbitt's structuralist modality draws "inferences from the existence of consti-
tutional structures and the relationships which the Constitution ordains among these
structures."' 102 But it is something slightly more than that, as he explains: "Structuralist
arguments are largely factless and depend on deceptively simple logical moves from
the entire Constitutional text, rather than from one of its parts."' °3 Charles Black,
whom Bobbitt holds up as the paradigmatic structuralist, explains the methodology
this way: "[J]udgment is reached not fundamentally on the basis of that [narrow] kind
of textual exegesis which we tend to regard as normal, but on the basis of reasoning
from the total structure which the text has created."'" Here, then, is the focus modal-
ity of the intratextual metaphor; that particular spot in the textualist field to which
intratextualism draws our eye. The methodology thus arises out of the reorganized
and now coexisting commonplaces associated with textualism and structuralism.
An attempt to reconstruct the modal metaphor might emphasize the neutral focal
point that the words provide, but then stress an interpretive approach that eschews
98 BOBBrT, FATE, supra note 3, at 7.
9 CBS News Special: Justice Black and the Bill of Rights (CBS television broadcast Dec. 3,
1968), in Justice Black and the Bill of Rights, 9 Sw. U. L. REv. 937,947 (1977) [hereinafter
Justice Black] (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
10o BOBBrrr, FATE, supra note 3, at 31.
101 Justice Black, supra note 99, at 940.
102 BOBB1TT, FATE, supra note 3, at 74.
103 Id.
104 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRucTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONsTITUTIoNAL LAW 15
(1969).
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
"contemporary man on the street"' 5 definitions in favor of understandings that
are common to the larger constitutional text and structure. In this way-as a modal
metaphor-intratextualism may allow us to perceive constitutional meanings of which
we were not yet aware.
We can assess the acceptance and value of intratextualism as a part of the consti-
tutional discourse in two different ways. The first is by looking through the history
of constitutional practice to see if the technique enjoys widespread use. Professor
Amar has already done an admirable job of this, and he has ably demonstrated that
intratextualist arguments appear in the most canonical of our constitutional cases and
commentaries."° As I suggested above, it seems that the intratextualist metaphor has
been with us from very early on-perhaps it should even count as one of the original
modalities of interpretation-but, whenever it first made an appearance, I suggest
that it represents a metaphoric kind of a thought about textual interpretation. Its early
acceptance and widespread use in the practice are in this way evidence that the meta-
phor is a good and useful one, and that it hardened into part of our literal practice
at an early stage.
The second kind of assessment may be unique to the theoretical sphere of
constitutional discourse. I suggest that we can evaluate whether "intratextualism"--
Amar' s specific modal label-has gained acceptance in the practice, and has influ-
enced practitioners moving forward. While the first kind of assessment is perhaps
more significant to constitutional law as a whole, the second has value as a measure
of the academy's impact on the constitutional conversation. A quick search reveals
that, although the Supreme Court has not invoked intratextualism by name since 1999,
the methodology has made an appearance in several amicus briefs.10 7 More signifi-
cantly, the circuit courts have referenced the technique in at least three cases, albeit
in opinions authored by particularly academic-minded judges.' °8 And, not surpris-
ingly, Amar' s approach has had its greatest impact in the academic community, where,
at last check, more than 260 scholarly articles had specifically addressed intratextualism
since Amar coined the term.
105 BOBBIT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 12-13.
'o See supra notes 66-95 and accompanying text.
107 E.g., Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Sabri v.
United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2003) (No. 03-44); Brief of Malla Pollack, Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), reprinted in
324 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 447, 461 n. 4 (Gerhard Casper & Kathleen M. Sullivan eds., 2004)
(citing Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 22, at 748).
08 Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370,382 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Silberman, J., writing
for the majority); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446,451 (7th Cir. 2005)
(Easterbrook, J., writing for the majority) (citing Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 22, at
747); Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1071 n.27 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., writing
for the majority).
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In less than a decade, then, the intratextualist metaphor has gained widespread
acceptance in the theoretical sphere, and it is slowly but surely seeping into the realms
of advocacy and judging. On these terms, I think we can qualify intratextualism (by
name) as a successful or strong modal metaphor. Moreover, if we look back through
the history of constitutional practice, as Amar has done, we can see that intratextualism
(perhaps by other names) has long been an accepted mode of constitutional discourse.
Thus, I suggest that intratextualism is a singularly straightforward and compelling
example of an interactive modal metaphor.
B. Louis Brandeis: The Brandeis Brief
In February of 1903, the State of Oregon passed a law limiting the number of
hours a day women could spend working at certain trades °9 Two years later, Curt
Muller, owner of the Grand Laundry in Portland, challenged the state statute as a
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment liberty to contract with his workers, and the
case eventually found its way to the Supreme Court." ° In 1907, two National
Consumer League lawyers-Florence Kelley and Josephine Goldmark-hired Louis
Brandeis to represent Oregon in Washington; a decision that Goldmark would later
claim "gave a revolutionary new direction tojudicial thinking, indeed to the judicial
process itself.""' Brandeis envisioned presenting a new kind of written argument
to the Court; one not limited to the traditional legal forms, but instead built on facts
about the social conditions that Oregon's law sought to address." 2 Working for two
straight weeks, a team of ten researchers mined the Columbia University and New
York Public Libraries for data on the detrimental effects of extended work hours on
women: "[T]he research team unearthed the reports of English factory commissions
and medical commissions, translated sources from western Europe, and amassed
information from states with women's hours laws. In each source, they sought
statements about the dangers of long hours and the benefits of shorter ones."' " The
result was an unprecedented 113-page brief, which relied heavily on the testimony
of a range of nonjudicial authorities-from doctors to sanitary inspectors-to
persuade the justices that the challenged statute was a reasonable exercise of
Oregon's police power to protect women's health.' The State won a unanimous
decision, and the phenomenon known as the Brandeis Brief was born."5
It is perhaps now conventional to think of Brandeis's Muller brief as a clear-cut
exercise in prudential argument, one intended to convince the Court that the social
109 NANCY WOLOCH, MULLER V. OREGON: ABRIEF HISTORY WITH DoCUMENTS 21(1996).
"o Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1908).
il WOLOCH, supra note 109, at 23.
112 Id. at 27-29.
"13 Id. at 28.
"' Id. at 29.
... Muller, 208 U.S. at 423.
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benefits of the Oregon law simply outweighed the costs as a matter of sound consti-
tutional policy. But that is not quite the whole story. After all, Muller was decided
at a particularly interesting moment in our legal history, just two years after the now-
infamous Lochner decision, in which the Court summarily rejected the constitu-
tional importance of men's health in striking down maximum-hour legislation in
New York."6 Thus, Brandeis had to tailor his factual arguments quite narrowly to
fit within the existing doctrinal framework, and for this reason modern critics often
attack the brief for its (necessary) reliance on gender differences and vulnerabilities." 7
In this way, Brandeis's approach is not strictly prudential in nature; rather, it focuses
on particular kinds of social facts that are directly relevant to fairly specific aspects
of the constitutional doctrine. It is certainly something more than the broad kind of
prudential argument that Bobbitt describes, which "need not treat the merits of the
particular controversy ... [but] instead advanc[es] particular doctrines according
to the practical wisdom of using the courts in a particular way."" " I suggest that the
Muller brief is a modal metaphor--one that combines doctrine and prudence-and
if we now view it as a literal act of prudentialism, then that is a testament to the strength
and success of Brandeis's insight: it has become a dead metaphor.
It is worth briefly revisiting Brandeis's approach in Muller, particularly the struc-
ture of the overall argument, to deconstruct the modal metaphor. It is sometimes
forgotten that Brandeis actually submitted two briefs in the case: the first, prepared
by the Oregon Attorney General, focuses strictly on the doctrinal issues.l ' The sec-
ond and more famous brief summarizes the doctrine concisely, and then explores the
social data described above. 120 It is instructive that Brandeis believed he needed both
briefs to make his argument. He needed to establish the doctrinalframe within which
to posit his prudentialfocus. It is not worth recounting in detail the doctrinal brief,
which explores seven state decisions and six federal decisions, but a quick look at
Brandeis's concise summation of the case law is helpful. He cites Lochner for the
116 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905).
117 See, e.g., BARBARA BABCOCKErAL., SEx DISCRIMINATION ANDTHELAW 29-30 (1975);
SUSAN LEHRER, ORIGINS OF PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN, 1905-1925, at
54-56 (1987); see also WOLOCH, supra note 109, at 31-32.
119 BOBBrT, FATE, supra note 3, at 7. Think, for example, of the kind of prudential argu-
ment we find in Marshall's McCulloch opinion. This argument is directed at the simple polit-
ical efficiencies of having a national bank from which to salary the troops during wartime.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408-09 (1819). It is plainly not the kind of doctrinally
focused prudentialism that Brandeis employs in Muller.
"9 Brief for the State of Oregon, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107),
reprinted in 16 LANDMARKBRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OFTHE SUPREMECOURT OFTHEUNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 37 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
120 Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107),
reprinted in 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975)
[hereinafter Brandeis Brief, LANDMARK BRIEFS].
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proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the "liberty" of contract, sub-
ject to reasonable state impositions of police power to provide for public "health,
safety, morals, and the general welfare."' 2' He then acknowledges that Jacobson v.
Massachusetts stipulates that a valid exercise of this police power "must have a real
or substantial relation to the protection of the public health and the public safety."'' 22
Finally, he returns to Lochner and recasts the relevant language to establish the doc-
trinal ground rules by which he intends to play:
The validity of the Oregon statute must therefore be sustained
unless the Court can find that there is no "fair ground, reasonable
in and of itself, to say that there is material danger to the public
health (or safety), or to the health (or safety) of the employees (or
to the general welfare), if the hours of labor are not curtailed.' ' 23
Through a skillful bit of doctrinalism, then, Brandeis has set the stage for an in-
depth analysis of both the social data regarding the particular dangers women may
face by remaining too long in the workplace, and the reasonableness of the specific
state regulation.
While far from a seamless narrative, the exegesis that follows is not quite the
"hodgepodge" that Owen Fiss has described. 24 Rather, the body of the brief is ex-
plicitly organized around the two basic doctrinal elements: (1) whether Oregon's
law is "reasonable"; and (2) whether extended hours present a "material danger" to
women's health and safety.2 2 Thus, nearly the first twenty pages of the argument-
comprising the "Part First"-are devoted to an extensive survey of existing state
and foreign2 6 laws regulating women's workdays.127 This first section is plainly an
effort to show the relative "reasonableness" of Oregon's legislation. The remaining
ninety-five pages-the "Part Second"-are broken into a number of subsections explor-
ing both "The Dangers of Long Hours" and the "General Benefits" and "Economic
Aspect[s]" of short hours. 28 Again, this is a transparent effort to tailor the sociolog-
ical data to the doctrinal touchstones. As I have suggested above, this is not simply
an out-and-out utilitarian brand of prudentialism; it is a species of prudentialism
121 Id. at 74 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53, 67).
122 Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)) (internal quotations
omitted).
123 Id. at 75 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61).
124 Owen M. Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modem State, 1888-1910, in THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMEs DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 175 (1993).
"2 Brandeis Brief, LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 74-75.
126 This appeal to foreign law has fascinating echoes in more recent jurisprudence, notably
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003).
127 Brandeis Brief, LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 66-82.
128 Id. at 83, 122, 130.
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evolved to suit a specific doctrinal landscape. The Brandeis Brief, then, is a powerful
modal metaphor that takes doctrinalism as its frame and prudentialism as its focus.
An effort to reconstruct the overlapping systems of doctrinal and prudential
commonplaces might begin by recognizing the values of neutral principle, reliance,
and custom that characterize doctrinal argument; then cast these values in terms of
the evolving empirical understandings and changing social values that prudential
argument emphasizes. Understood in this way, Brandeis's metaphor-let us call it
"doctrinal-prudentialism"-allows us to apply neutral judicial doctrines to modem
problems in innovative and efficient ways. It enables the advocate orjudge to intro-
duce cutting-edge, nonjudicial information into longstanding legal rubrics and vener-
able doctrinal tests, thereby permitting the "rule of law" to account for current social
realities. Given the interpretive flexibility this modal metaphor makes possible, it is
fairly easy, I think, to understand the acceptance and value of doctrinal-prudentialism
within the practice of constitutional law. In historian Nancy Woloch's words, "The
era after Muller became a golden age of Brandeis briefs, which mushroomed in size
as the data mounted. The goals of the briefs expanded, too, to include maximum
hours for men in industry and the minimum wage for women."' 29
In this way, the Brandeis Brief represents a particularly discreet moment of
constitutional evolution-an act of constitutional creativity-of the sort I was not
able, and did not attempt, to identify with precision in the case of intratextualism.
While a careful examination might reveal historical antecedents of doctrinal-
prudential arguments that predate Louis Brandeis, I suggest that it is Brandeis's
particular metaphor that captured the attention of constitutional practitioners and
allowed it to harden into a widely accepted interpretive mode. Indeed, Louis
Brandeis was appointed and confirmed to a seat on the Supreme Court within a
decade, and by 1937 the Constitution came to embrace what Bruce Ackerman has
called "the activist welfare state."' 30 And while Brandeis Briefs may not be as in
vogue as they once were, I think it is safe to say that doctrinal-prudentialism is now
a well-established mode of constitutional argument. 131
129 WOLOCH, supra note 109, at 41.
130 Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1737, 1761 (2007).
Professor Ackerman has reminded me that the growth of the activist state, or what he calls
"government by numbers," was the product of a much broader sociopolitical movement in
the early decades of the twentieth century. See Bruce Ackerman, The CivilRights Revolution,
in WE THE PEOPLE (forthcoming) (copy on file with author). I certainly do not mean to suggest
that the Brandeis Brief is the sole, or even primary, engine of that wider change; I merely sug-
gest that Brandeis's modal metaphor is the conduit through which this larger change entered
constitutional practice.
1 ' Doctrinal prudentialist arguments are frequently made in support of the "rational basis"
a state may have had for legislation challenged pursuant to the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clauses. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), available at 1999 WL 1032809; Brief
for the Appellants, Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (No. 80-23 1), available at 1980
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C. Brown v. Board of Education: Resolving A Modal Conflict
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education is undoubtedly
among the most important moments in our twentieth-century constitutional conver-
sation. 132 In some minds, it signaled the beginning of a profound constitutional rev-
olution that resulted in the landmark Civil Rights statutes of the 1960s.' If not a
revolution, it was, at the very least, a moment of deep constitutional creativity, in which
the Court confronted a direct and entrenched modal conflict, and ultimately resolved
it by means of a powerful modal metaphor. The Court faced a number of contradict-
ing modal arguments: the text plainly promised "equal protection," but the doctrine
permitted "separate but equal" treatment; history suggested that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not reach segregated schooling, 134 but the constitutional structure
hardly seemed to favor barriers to conversation and association among citizens.1"
I contend that the advocates and the Court overcame these conflicts by creating a
modal metaphor that takes ethical argument as its frame and posits prudentialism
as its focus. In an effort to fully illustrate both the conflicting modalities and the
Court's metaphor, I will briefly sketch the social, political, and legal context in which
Brown was decided, and then revisit some of the less-publicized aspects of the argu-
ment and decision-making process.
After the cataclysm of the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment promised all
Americans "the equal protection of the laws." '136 This promise was specifically in-
tended to ensure legal equality between the races, and a new Civil Rights Act soon
followed that entitled blacks to "the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water,
theaters, and other places of public amusement .... ",13 Over the next twenty years,
however, the promise of racial equality seemed to wither on the vine, and in 1896 the
Supreme Court gave its blessing to Jim Crow era racial segregation by embracing
"separate but equal" as constitutional doctrine. 13 8 Thus, for the first half of the twen-
tieth century, the textual promise of "equal protection" had little force when brought
WL 339846; Brief for the Appellees, Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (No. 742),
available at 1968 WL 129327.
132 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133 Ackerman, supra note 130, at 1762-65.
134 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATiONANDBLACKAMERICA'S STRUGGLEFOREQUALrrY 656-57 (1975) (describing law
clerk Alexander Bickel's year-long "open-ended assignment" from Justice Frankfurter, which
parsed the historical record and revealed no evidence that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had intended to abolish school segregation).
131 See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421,429-30(1960).
136 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335, 336.
131 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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into conflict with a doctrinal position that, in fact, allowed for superior and inferior
classes of citizenship. But as American blacks returned from World War 11-where
they had fought valiantly against the forces of racial supremacy--they began to demand
racial equality at home. 139 In 1946, President Harry Truman appointed a Committee
On Civil Rights to study the issue, and in 1948, he issued Executive Order 9981, which
guaranteed "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed ser-
vices without regard to race, color, religion or national origin."' 4 At the same time,
Thurgood Marshall, Charles Houston, and other NAACP lawyers began to bring the
desegregation fight to the courts.'l4 In 1948, the Supreme Court invalidated racially
restrictive property covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer, and revived a seemingly forgotten
ethos of American democracy-an ethic grounded in equality and basic fairness-
which began, slowly, to motivate the Court's jurisprudence. 142
Phil Elman, former law clerk and long-time friend of Felix Frankfurter, wrote
a historic brief for the Solicitor General's office in Shelley; one which, for the first
time in many years, put the United States government firmly on the side of racial
equality. 143 He later recalled that brief as being largely an ethical kind of argument:
"It was not an ordinary brief. It was a statement of national policy. We were show-
ing the flag; we were expressing an authoritative, forthright position that all govern-
ment officials would be bound by."'" Even one of the most recalcitrant members
of the Court, Chief Justice Fred Vinson, would note that Elman's brief "certainly had
heart appeal" as it played to the most elemental of American values. 145 And during
oral argument, Elman recalls the words of an elderly black lawyer that captured the
Court's attention:
It was a dull argument until he came to the very end. [But] [h]e
concluded his argument by saying... "Now I've finished my legal
argument, but I want to say this before I sit down. In this Court,
this house of the law, the Negro today stands outside, and he
knocks on the door, over and over again, he knocks on the door
"9 I should note that the NAACP legal team was working tirelessly against segregation
before the war even began. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)
(finding "separate but equal" not satisfied when a state pays to send black students out of state).
14o Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948).
141 KLUGER, supra note 134, at 251.
142 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
143 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (No.
72), reprinted in 46 LANDMARK BRIEFs AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CoNsTrrUTIONALLAw 233 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
'" Interview by Norman Silber with Philip Elman, Law Clerk to Justice Felix Frankfurter,
as reprinted in The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights
Litigation, 1946-60: An Oral History, 100 HARv. L. REv. 817, 819 (1987) [hereinafter
Interview with Elman].
145 KLUGER, supra note 134, at 252.
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and cries out, 'Let me in, let me in, for I too have helped build
this house."' All of a sudden there was drama in the courtroom,
a sense of what the case was really all about rather than the tech-
nical legal arguments. The Negro had helped build this house,
and he wanted to be let in the door. Well, I've never forgotten
this man whose name I don't remember, who in a few sentences
made the most moving plea in the Court I've ever heard.'4
Attorney General Tom Clark-who would sit as a member of the Court for Brown-
published Elman's brief as a book, 147 and a growing number of civil rights litigants
rode a renewed wave of American egalitarianism into Court.14 1 In deciding these
cases, the Court seemed to be rediscovering, or at least revitalizing, some funda-
mental tenets of the American ethos. It was reinforcing an ethical foundation upon
which to build the difficult decisions to come.
Among the most notable of these cases-Sweatt v. Painter--came out of Texas,
where the University of Texas Law School systematically denied admission to black
students.149 The state had set up separate law schools for blacks, and argued that these
institutions met with Plessy's "separate but equal" requirement.15° The NAACP
argued that the separate law schools were not, in fact, equal, but were inferior and did
not carry the same prestige as the University of Texas.15' The Court agreed, finding
that "the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those quali-
ties which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in
a law school," and accordingly enjoined the school's exclusive admissions policy.' 2
But, while reflective of the emerging civil rights ethic, the opinion did not squarely
address the central constitutional conflict: whether Plessy and "separate but equal"
truly was the nation's higher law. After all, Sweatt (and McLaurin, decided the same
day) simply concluded that the particular acts of segregation did not satisfy the Plessy
doctrine; not that such segregation was per se unconstitutional.'53 This fact did not
"4 Interview with Elman, supra note 144, at 820.
147 ToM C. CLARK & PHILIP B. PERLMAN, PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY: AN HISTORIC BRIEF
AGAINST RACIAL COVENANTS (1948).
" Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (invalidating racial segregation prac-
ticed under the Interstate Commerce Act); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ.,
339 U.S. 637 (1950) (invalidating classroom segregation in graduate schools); see, e.g., Sipuel
v. Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (requiring states to provide a black law school);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (invalidating racial restrictions on
commercial fishing licenses).
149 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).110 Id. at 632.
"'l Brief for Petitioner, Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629 (No. 44), reprinted in CLARK & PERLMAN,
supra note 147, at 62-73.
152 Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634, 636.
113 Id. at 636; McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642.
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go unnoticed in the South, where, in anticipation of future suits, the governors
of South Carolina and Virginia both made considerable financial efforts to equalize
(materially) the existing black schools. 54 The NAACP and others, of course, believed
that any racial separation was inherently unequal, but it would be another two years
before their epic challenge to segregated public elementary schools would raise this
issue directly and inescapably.
In late 1952, NAACP lawyers brought a quartet of grade school segregation cases
before the Supreme Court: Brown v. Board of Education out of Kansas; Briggs v.
Elliott out of South Carolina; Davis v. County School Board out of Virginia; and
Gebhart v. Belton out of Delaware.' The Court heard oral arguments on the con-
solidated cases on December 9, but a decision would be long postponed as the Justices
(particularly Felix Frankfurter) 156 strategized the best judicial means of resolving an
issue that was as much social and political as it was legal. In those oral arguments,
the petitioners made it clear that they intended to challenge the "separate but equal"
doctrine itself rather than the relative quality of black schools: "It is the gravamen of
our complaint... [that] the act of segregation in and of itself denies [black children]
educational opportunities which the Fourteenth Amendment secures."157 This tactic
placed the conflicting constitutional modalities in bold relief. The direct challenge to
the "separate but equal" doctrine laid a potent ethical argument squarely before the
Court, and forced the justices to reconcile the other modalities as best they could.
Even though most Americans recognized Brown's profound ethical implications-
Philip Elman recalls feeling that "[t]he constitutional issue went to the heart of what
kind of country we are, what kind of Constitution and Supreme Court we have"-and
the justices remained divided through much of 1953.' Justices Hugo Black and
William Douglas were in favor of immediately and unconditionally overruling
Plessy. Black, the textualist, later explained his rationale quite directly: "I never,
for one moment, based my decision on anything except [that] I thought it was a denial
of equal protection of the law then, had been in the past, and will be in the future."'
159
Robert Jackson-at least if we are to believe his law clerk William Rehnquist-
believed that the NAACP was "[u]rging a view palpably at variance with precedent
and probably with legislative history," though his final position on the issue was much
more sympathetic."W Justice Harold Burton, a conservative Midwesterner, slowly
'i4 Interview with Elman, supra note 144, at 823.
'5 KLUGER, supra note 134, at 535-40.
156 Elman would later call Frankfurter the Kochleffel-the cooking spoon that stirred the
Court on the segregation issue. Interview with Elman, supra note 144, at 832.
'" Transcript of Oral Argument, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (No.8), reprinted
in ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at 12 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969) (emphasis added).
s8 Interview with Elman, supra note 144, at 843.
'59 Justice Black, supra note 99, at 941.
'60 Memorandum from William Rehnquist, Law Clerk, to Robert Jackson, Justice, United
States Supreme Court (undated), reprinted in MARK WHITMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF
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came around to the position that, even if Plessy was correct when decided, it was
no longer a viable doctrine: "Today ... I doubt that it can be said in any state...
that compulsory 'separation' of the races, even with equal facilities, can amount to
an 'equal' protection .... ""' Justice Sherman Minton eventually came to share
Burton's opinion, though his position was initially unclear, and many thought he
might vote to affirm.'62
Chief Justice Fred Vinson and Tom Clark both thought the issue would be better
settled in the state legislatures, and sought to delay a decision as long as possible.
63
Justice Stanley Reed, for his part, was flatly opposed to overruling Plessy as a matter
of stare decisis. 6' Frankfurter, the master strategist, thought Plessy was wrong but
counseled patience in overturning it, as he believed the Court was not well-positioned
at that time to initiate such a momentous social change. He later confided in Judge
Learned Hand, "I will tell you that if the 'great libertarians' [Black and Douglas] had
had their way we would have been in the soup. ' 165 Recognizing the looming impasse,
Frankfurter began to look for a historical argument to break the modal deadlock. He
assigned his law clerk Alexander Bickel a year-long research project on the framing
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the resulting memorandum was largely inconclu-
sive regarding public education. 166 And so, while most-if not all-of the justices
agreed that the ethical arguments weighed in favor of overturning Plessy,167 some
believed that other modalities pointed persuasively in different directions. It was not
until Fred Vinson's death in 1953, and Earl Warren's subsequent appointment, that
the Court was ready to embrace an ethical-prudential solution.
168
Two kinds of prudential arguments, both advanced in the briefs submitted in
1952, became the focal point of the evolving modal metaphor as the Court heard re-
argument on the cases in 1954. The first kind of prudential argument, which appeared
explicitly in the NAACP brief, looked to a wealth of social and psychological
material suggesting that segregation had a negative impact on black children's self-
esteem.' 69 An appendix attached to the brief entitled The Effects of Segregation and
EDUCATiON:A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 196, 197 (2d ed. 2004). There is, however, consider-
able reason to doubt Rehnquist's word on the matter. See KLUGER, supra note 134, at 609 n.*.
161 KLUGER, supra note 134, at 613.
162 Id. at 615-17; see Interview with Elman, supra note 144, at 828.
163 KLUGER, supra note 134, at 614-15; accord Interview with Elman, supra note 144, at
828.
'6 KLUGER, supra note 134, at 617.
165 Id. at 606.
'6 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
167 Philip Elman recalls the shock in the courtroom when Milton Korman opened his argu-
ment for the respondents by reading from Roger Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.
Elman, supra note 144, at 836-37. This reliance on (and negative reaction to) "the one case
everyone agrees was the worst decision in the history of the Supreme Court" illustrates how
segregation seemed to settle within the American ethos. Id.
'6 See KLUGER, supra note 134, at 656.
169 Brief for Appellants, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in 49
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the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement vividly recalled
the doctrinal-prudentialism of the Brandeis Brief, but with a slightly different
focus. 170 Here, the petitioners relied on the social science data-including the
testimony of the famous "doll man," Kenneth Clark' 7 1-to indicate that the doctrine
itself was wrong.'72 In the public elementary school setting, separate could never
be equal. While this social science data was not entirely conclusive,173 it did
ultimately make an appearance in the Court's opinion. 74 But it was the second kind
of prudential argument, one grounded in the political realities, which truly made the
Court's landmark decision possible.
Years later Philip Elman would recall the "unprincipled" but ingenious prudential
argument he advanced in the Solicitor General's brief:
[It] is the one thing I'm proudest of in my whole career. Not
because it's a beautifully written brief; I don't think it is. Rather,
it's because we were the first to suggest ... that if the Court
should hold that racial segregation in public schools is uncon-
stitutional, it should give district courts a reasonable period of
time to work out the details and timing of implementation of the
decision. In other words, "with all deliberate speed." The reason
I'm so proud of that proposal is that it offered the Court a way
out of its dilemma, a way to end racial segregation without invit-
ing massive disobedience, a way to decide the constitutional issue
unanimously without tearing the Court apart. 175
Although the idea of delaying relief to wronged individuals was unconventional-
Elman would later say "it was just plain wrong as a matter of constitutional law"-it
was just the kind of creative push the Court needed to overcome the modal dead-
lock.176 Frankfurter would later tell Elman he had "rendered a real service to [his]
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 23, 35 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter
Brief for Appellants].
170 Id. at 41-42.
171 KLUGER, supra note 134, at 557. Kenneth Clark conducted experiments wherein he
asked children whether a black doll or a white doll looked smarter; most children chose the
white doll. Id.; see also Interview with Elman, supra note 144, at 837-38.
172 Brief for Appellants, supra note 169, at 35-36.
173 KLUGER, supra note 134, at 575. The negative effect Clark demonstrated on children's
self-esteem was just as pronounced among children who did not attend segregated schools,
which undercut the studies' force in court.
'74 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n. 11. This, instructively, is actually an act of Brandeisian
"doctrinal-prudentialism."
171 Interview with Elman, supra note 144, at 827 (emphasis added).
176 Id.
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country" by giving the Court an ethical-prudential way to decide the case. 77 The
Court would incorporate this approach into its unanimous opinion by expressly
reserving judgment on "appropriate relief' until another reargument could provide
"the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees."' 78 And, of course, it was
in the second Brown opinion that Chief Justice Warren borrowed Justice Holmes's
now famous phrase, which required the district courts to enforce desegregation "with
all deliberate speed."'
179
If the Brown Court really resolved an entrenched conflict between established
modalities by means of an ethical-prudential metaphor, how might we reconstruct
this new mode of argument? I suggest that ethical-prudentialism takes the basic,
elemental principles of the American ethos as its principal and defining context; it
looks first to those democratic, egalitarian, and libertarian values that define who
we are--or who we want to be-as a nation. But the metaphor then tempers ethical
idealism by focusing prudentially on the social and political realities of governing a
large and diverse population. It recognizes that, over time, institutions and interests
accrete around social and legal practices that may not reflect our best national self,
and therefore constitutional remedies sometimes require time and deliberation. Thus
caution and delay, while sometimes distasteful, are a necessary part of constitutional
growth. In the case of Brown, at least, this measured, metaphoric approach helped the
Court surmount a modal impasse. Again, in Philip Elman's words,
[M]any people think that "with all deliberate speed" was a disaster.
[But] it broke the logjam. It was the formula that the Court needed
in order to bring all the Justices together to decide the constitu-
tional issue on the merits correctly. Without "all deliberate speed"
in the remedy, the Court could never have decided the constitu-
tional issue in the strong, forthright, unanimous way that it did;
and it was essential for the Court to do so if its decision was to be
accepted and followed throughout the country. 80
In evaluating the acceptance of the ethical-prudential metaphor within the prac-
tice today, we must recognize that Brown-while not immediately embracedl'8'-now
17 Id. at 830.
78 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
17' Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955). The controversial phrase
is taken from Virginia v. West Virginia, 222 U.S. 17, 20 (1918), but some have suggested
that Holmes himself borrowed it from Francis Thompson's poem "The Hound of Heaven."
See FRANCIS THOMPsON, The Hound of Heaven 121, in I FLED HIM, DOWN THE NIGHTS AND
DOWN THE DAYS (1908) ("But with unhurrying chase, And unperturbed pace, Deliberate
speed, majestic instancy...").
1so Interview with Elman, supra note 144, at 830.
181 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1,26-28 (1959) (calling Brown "the hardest test of my belief in principled adjudication").
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holds an imperturbable place in the constitutional canon. Lawrence Lessig writes,
"No one questions Brown's result (anymore). Indeed, so completely has the legal
system reoriented itself after the decision that it may not even be possible to find the
legal material with which to mount a serious challenge to its conclusion." ' 2 Like-
wise, Bruce Ackerman has suggested that in contemporary politics "no Supreme
Court nominee could be confirmed if he refused to embrace Brown,"' 3 and Bobbitt
attributes Robert Bork's failure in this regard at least partly to his views on the de-
segregation cases. 4 But just because our modem practice universally accepts Brown
does not mean that we wholeheartedly accept ethical-prudentialism, which may seem
at once too idealist and too political for principled decision making. In fact, many
Americans seem to venerate Brown for its ethical foundation despite its prudentialist
compromise. It may be that the ethical-prudential metaphor was a one-trick pony,
that it was specifically tailored to meet a particularly acute constitutional crisis, and
that it was never destined to become a regular or common modality of constitutional
discourse.15 Be that as it may, however, I contend that it was the Court's grammatical
creativity-its willingness to re-envision and realign the accepted modalities at a crit-
ical moment in the nation's history-that enabled it to overcome a two-year judicial
standoff and render the most important constitutional decision of the last century.
CONCLUSION
The most profound theoretical advances in any field are those that open up
entirely new areas of inquiry, insights so fundamental that they expose completely
new kinds of questions-exactly the right kinds of questions-for those that follow
to confront. I suggest that Philip Bobbitt' s practice-based account of constitutional
law is this type of advance, and, like other such insights, it reveals important questions
that beg our attention. First among those questions, for me, is the problem of growth
or evolution in the practice of constitutional law. Because Bobbitt wants to legiti-
mate constitutional arguments internally-by looking to the practice of law, and not
to external foundational justifications-he seems to present a static and exclusive set
of argumentative modalities. For the same reasons, he struggles to account for the
resolution of modal conflicts; those cases where equally legitimate constitutional argu-
ments may point to divergent outcomes or meanings. Bobbitt concludes that this
final problem is a matter of judicial "conscience" and thus a part of the practical act
of decision making. While I agree conceptually with this solution, I suggest here
182 Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1165, 1242 (1992) (citations
omitted).
183 Ackerman, supra note 130, at 1752.
184 BOBBr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 92-93.
185 But see Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (concluding that the Vermont
Constitution guarantees homosexual couples the common benefits of heterosexual marriage, but
leaving it to the state legislature to fashion an appropriate remedy).
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that this "conscience" is something closer to judicial artistry. The great practitioners
of constitutional law are able to construct modal metaphors out of the existing forms
of argument, thus growing the practice internally to encompass changing social,
political, and legal circumstances. The best of these metaphors, I suggest, harden and
become a literal and legitimate part of the practice moving forward, while the others
are rejected or fall away quietly.
It is my deep admiration for Bobbitt's work that inspired this piece, and in it I have
only tried to make a small contribution to Bobbitt's larger and humbling theoretical
edifice. My intention here has simply been to provide a plausible account of the evo-
lution of constitutional practice in terms that are consistent with Bobbitt's larger thesis,
and I contend that a theory of growth through modal metaphor accomplishes this goal.
The goal itself is only worthwhile, however, if it provides some real theoretical or prac-
tical benefit to the practice of constitutional law, and so I want to close by offering an
honest appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the modal metaphor as an addition
to the practitioner's interpretive toolbox. Let me begin with the weaknesses.
In the limited space of this paper, I have not been able to adequately address the
question of how the original modalities came into being, or the order in which they
may have arisen. I have suggested above that a satisfying answer to this question might
ultimately need to resort to a foundational kind of explanation-perhaps something
analogous to Saul Kripke' s or Hilary Putnam's causal theory of reference-which is
a move that goes beyond the scope or ambitions of Bobbitt's project. Bobbitt was
satisfied to describe the practice of constitutional law, as it now exists, without refer-
ence or resort to its ultimate origins. It is a shortcoming of my account, however-
which hopes to describe constitutional evolution-that I have not traced this process
back to its original sources. I would very much like to be able to say which modality
came first (I suspect it is textualism) and then track the evolution of constitutional
practice in metaphoric terms. This might help the practitioner to gauge which modal-
ities are best suited to combine metaphorically, and which kinds of metaphors best
solve particular kinds of problems. Unfortunately, I am not prepared to provide a
detailed history of modal evolution here; though that is certainly an area I hope to
explore in future work.
A second and related question is whether or not the examples I provide really rep-
resent the emergence of entirely new modalities of constitutional argument-whether
these are truly examples of constitutional evolution-or whether they are simply
instances when constitutional practitioners have rediscovered or re-implemented
modalities of argument that already existed at other points in our constitutional con-
versation. This problem is most clearly present in the discussion of Professor Amar's
intratextualism, a method which has been around since nearly the beginning of our
interpretive practice. In response to the specific question about intratextualism, I
suggest that it is not particularly important for my purposes when this technique first
arose, only that it provides a clear illustration of the mechanics of a modal metaphor
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in action. In this sense, I am not concerned that Amar has only labeled and revitalized
a pre-existing metaphor-it is the clarity of the interactive mechanics at work that
I hope to demonstrate. In response to the more general objection about evolution
as opposed to rediscovery, I would suggest that-while a diligent scholar might find
historical antecedents of doctrinal-prudentialism, for example, that predate Louis
Brandeis--each metaphoric construction, even of the same two modalities, is slightly
different; and what is important is how a particularly powerful modal metaphor affects
the practice. In other words, Brandeis's contribution-his metaphor-was unique to
the particular issue it confronted; and given the circumstances it was a particularly
strong and effective metaphor, which is reflected in the effect it had on the practice.
Doctrinal-prudentialism, as Brandeis constructed it, moved the entire practice forward,
and that is the phenomenon I hope to have illustrated.
Having appraised potential shortcomings of my account, I also want to point out
what I hope are the benefits of conceiving constitutional growth in terms of modal
metaphors. First, the concept may be helpful to theorists or advocates who seek to
resolve constitutional problems or express their constitutional insights in new and
creative ways. For them, the great lesson of Bobbitt's work is that there are rules to
follow. It is not useful to build theories on argumentative modalities that are entirely
outside of the existing practice-to do so is akin to speaking the wrong language, or
uttering nonsense words, when trying to express an important point in conversation.
(Anyone who has witnessed a pro se appellate argument has probably seen this happen.)
The modal metaphor, however, provides some creative flexibility within the existing
rules. If the skillful advocate can combine the existing modalities to express a new
constitutional thought, she can make an important contribution to the practice. The
real trick, I suggest, is making the modal metaphor a strong and vital one. To do so,
the advocate must pick the right frame and the right focus to suit the facts and circum-
stances, and she must have deft facility with the existing modalities (the language) to
create the most persuasive form of the metaphor possible. This, as I have suggested,
is more art than science.
The metaphor model also provides a normative account-though it may seem
unsatisfying to some-of "better" constitutional theories or arguments. In keeping
with Bobbitt's initial insight, this account is not foundational-it does not purport
to reveal absolute answers. Rather, I suggest that the way to evaluate metaphoric
arguments is over time, as we see their value and assimilation into the practice. In this
way, the modal metaphor is most like the kind of linguistic metaphor Max Black
labels "catachresis"; it is intended to fill an expressive gap in the practice. Thus, we
must evaluate modal metaphors based on how successfully they fill the gaps that
arise, by deciding over time whether the new mode of argument contributes some-
thing important or useful to our understanding of constitutional meaning. The proof
is in the pudding, so to speak; the metaphors that contribute something of value
become permanent and accepted fixtures within the practice, while those that do not
[Vol. 17:157
METAPHORS AND MODALITIES
fade away, perhaps to be revived some day to meet a future problem. This is of little
help, I concede, to the judge who must make an immediate constitutional decision;
but, again, this is the essential creative nature of the judicial role in our practice. Again,
the final act of decision necessarily remains something closer to art than science. That
much, I suggest, remains completely consistent with Bobbitt' s original account, and
I can add very little that he has not already expressed more eloquently.
In introducing Charles Black's substantial contribution to modem constitutional
practice, Bobbitt recalls words T.S. Eliot penned in an introduction to a new edition
of Seneca: "[Flew things that can happen to a nation are more important than the
invention of a new form of verse."' 6 Eliot's thought seems at first startling, but a
little reflection reveals its depth. If the mechanics of metaphor really do-as Max
Black and others contend-replicate some of the essential mechanics of thought, then
a new form of verse can allow us to comprehend some part of our world anew. At the
very least, a new form of verse enables us to express ourselves to one another in ways
not before possible; it gives us means to interdependently affect and change our col-
lective understanding of the human condition. This, I contend, is also the elemental
power of the modal metaphor in the practice of constitutional law. It gives to the deft
and insightful practitioner-the constitutional poet-the tools of profound human
change. And, as with poetry, there are no absolutes in the constitutional conversation,
only ideas and insights that might move us, in some small measure, closer to our
better selves.
'86 BOBBrIT, FATE, supra note 3, at 77 (citing T.S. Eliot, Introduction to SENECA: HIS TENNE
TRAGEDIES v, xlix (T.S. Eliot & Thomas Newton eds., Constable & Co., Ltd. 1927) (1581)).
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